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Improving Mexico's Energy Security Framework:  
a new role for the Navy? 
 This paper examines the decree presented by the 
President of Mexico and approved by the National 
Congress to reform the country’s legal framework 
and allow the shift of maritime safety and security 
responsibility, as well as port state control from a 
civil authority (Ministry of Communications and 
Transport, MCT) towards a military one (Ministry 
of Marine, MMAR). 
 
 The previous failures of the Mexican Designated 
Authority, executed by the General Direction of 
Merchant Marine (GDMM) from MCT resulted into 
an important number of security incidents and 
maritime accidents which have contributed in turn 
not only in loss of property at sea, but also loss of 
human life and significant marine pollution; poor 
inspections to tankers operating in the Mexican oil 
market and to Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(MODUs). 
 
Improving Mexico's Energy Security Framework:  
a new role for the Navy? 
 
 Security concerns are always in the spotlight, with Mexico 
facing huge challenges related to oil theft from pipelines and 
distribution networks, as well as plundering of offshore 
platforms and confiscated vessels; 
 
 The decree changed the control of all Masters of Harbours, 
from MCT to MMAR. However, there is a dualism to some 
extent and it is necessary to change the appointment of the 
Designated Authority from MCT to the MMAR to represent the 
country in every aspect before the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to avoid a duality of functions at these two 
institutions and to ensure compliance with obligations derived 
from IMO Conventions; 
 
 Methodology; 
 
 Results & Conclusions. 
 
Master of Harbour (management’s) History in Mexico 
 It was under the Ministry of Marina (the Mexican Navy), which was created in 1940. 
 
 Until 1976 the Ministry of Marine kept the control of ports and the merchant marine. 
 
 In 1977 the ex-president José López Portillo reformed the Organic Law of Public Federal Administration 
giving to the Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT) all activities related to the development and 
promotion of merchant marine, as well as the construction of port infrastructure and its respective 
administration and operation.  
 
 However, the MCT and particularly the Master of Harbours, also called as Port Captainships in Mexico 
never got the necessary equipment to exercise its authority in a satisfactory manner. 
 
 40 years later, this functions were reallocated to the authorities of MMAR through several reforms, such as 
Organic Law of Public Administration, Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade and the Law of Ports to 
transfer the control, inspection, vigilance and other activities related to the merchant marine and the 
maritime industry, including the Masters of Harbours from a civil authority (MCT) towards a military one 
(MMAR), but excluding port development and its administration.  
 
 This law initiative was approved by the National Congress without any change and published as a decree 
on the Official Diary of the Federation (ODF) on 19th December, 2016. 
 
 The decree establishes the new attributions of the Ministry of Marine, which shall enter into force after 180 
“natural days” of its publication in the ODF, specifically on 17th June, 2017. 
 
 
The decree 
 However, the decree does not specify clearly enough the change of the Maritime Authority from MCT to MMAR, creating a 
duality of some serious attributions concerning the existence of only one entity to represent the country before international 
organizations for the negotiations of international treaties, and executing its obligations derived of such international 
conventions as an executor organ with respect to maritime safety and security, among other areas. 
 
 The reform to the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade empowers both, the MMAR and MCT to represent the country in the 
negotiations with international conventions in the maritime realm; and to be the executor organ and its interpret in the 
administrative sphere with respect to the attributions that according to this law, to each of them corresponds. 
 
 It clarifies that the master of the harbours, are transferred to the Ministry of Marine, redistributing the attributions that they 
currently have, leaving uniquely to the Ministry of Communications and Transport those related with the regulation, organization 
and administration of the merchant marine. 
 
 It provides attributions to the MMAR to approve and give the licenses for passenger & tourism maritime transport services with 
small boats; authorize the vessels to bear away and bear off as well as customs clearance; flag and register of vessels, 
administrate the national registers both, of maritime crew and ships; inspect and verify national and foreign vessels; the 
compliance of international conventions as well as national legislation and official Mexican norms related to maritime safety and 
security; safeguard human life at sea and the prevention of marine pollution; the imposition of sanctions; as well as appointing 
and removing master of harbours. 
 
 It confirms the Ministry of Communications and Transport to continue leading the administration of ports, foment for port 
development, training and control of merchant marine; construction of port infrastructure and dredger of ocean, maritime and 
fluvial passages; development of the maritime industry; concessions, permissions and maritime fees and in general, all 
maritime business related to productive activity generator of economic resources. 
 
 Another inconsistency is that it will be the MCT which will be the responsible institution for planning, formulating and conducting 
the politic programs for the development of water transport and the merchant marine and which will regulate and verify that the 
pilot service is offered in a safe and efficient form.  
 
Master of Harbour duties 
 Maritime safety 
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea                          
(SOLAS), 1974 and protocols),  
 ISM Code 
 Search and rescue operations/systems 
 Port State Control 
 
 Maritime security 
 ISPS Code 
 
 Marine environment’s protection 
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL, 1978). 
 
International Safety Management Code 
(ISM Code) 
 International Management Code for the Safe 
Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention, (ISM Code) of 1993. 
 
 Established first as guidelines (no 
mandatory). Amended in 1994, Chapter IX, 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention 
1974. Entered into force 1st. July, 1998. 
 
 It was amended in 2000, 2004, 2005, 2008 
and 2013, according to resolutions 
MSC.104(73), MSC.179(79), MSC.195(80), 
MSC.273(85), which entered into force on 1 
July 2002, on 1 July 2006, on 1 January 
2009, and on 1 July 2010, respectively, and 
resolution MSC.353(92), which entered into 
force on 1 January 2015. 
 
 The purpose of the ISM Code is to provide an 
international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and for 
pollution prevention. It establishes minimum 
common requirements for SMS. 
 
 Criminal/administrative liability. 
 Safety Culture on-board vessels & at the shipping 
company. 
 
 Establishes diverse safety-management objectives. 
 
 requires a safety management system (SMS). 
 
 «The Company»  
• Approach the ship-owning company as the primary subject of 
obligations. 
 
 «Designated Person (DP)»  
• Direct  access to the highest level of management. 
 
 Safety Management Manual. 
• Planning of ship operations on board vessels 
• Emergency preparedness. 
International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS Code) 
 September 11th, 2001, 
 
 Chapter XI-2, Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS) Convention 
1974,  
 
 Whereas part A of the Code 
-mandatory provisions,  
 
 Part B not mandatory 
 
 There is not a penalty-
mechanism in place at IMO 
for member states that don’t 
effectively comply with the 
ISPS Code; 
 Designated 
Authority 
 
 Maritime Security 
Levels 1,2,3 
 
 PSA / PFSA 
 
 PSP / PFSP 
 
 Approval & Comp. 
of Security plans. 
 
 Inspections, Audits, 
Drills & Exercises 
ISPS Code 
 The decree on the Agreement for the 
Establishment of Safety and Security 
Zones; for Navigation and Overflight in the 
Surroundings of Offshore Installations and 
Integral and Sustainable Exploitation of 
Fishery and Aquaculture Resources in 
Mexican Marine Areas was presented by 
the current President of Mexico, Enrique 
Peña Nieto and published on the Diary 
official of the Federation (DOF) on 11th 
October, 2016.  
 
 It has a direct impact in maritime safety 
and security around the oil platforms 
located at the continental shelf in the Gulf 
of Mexico and vessels doing loading and 
unloading operations at the area. 
 
 A “Security and Safety Zone” in the 
surroundings of oil drills, platforms of “500 
metres from its external border”. 
Standards of Traininng, Certification and 
Watchkeeping (STCW Code), 1978 
 Extremely important concerning training for both, safety 
and security, 
 
 Adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 
April 1984 
 
 Its purpose is to promote safety of life and property at sea 
and the protection of the marine environment by 
establishing international standards of training, 
certification and watchkeeping for seafarers. 
 
 The Manila amendments to the STCW Convention and 
Code were adopted on 25th June 2010, marking a major 
revision of both, the Convention and STCW Code.  
 
 Whereas part A of the Code -mandatory provisions,  
 
 Part B is not mandatory. 
 
 Several areas of the STCW Code that overlap with some 
provisions of the ISM Code, as well as the ISPS Code 
 Prevent fraudulent practices related to the 
expedition of certificates of competency 
 
 Strengthen the evaluation process and new 
requirements related to training in modern 
technology such as electronic charts information 
systems (ECDIS) and Dynamic Positioning 
Systems. 
 
 Marine environment awareness training and 
training in leadership and teamwork. 
 
 Updating of competence requirements for 
employees serving on board all types of tankers, 
including new requirements for personnel serving 
on liquefied gas tankers and for personnel serving 
on board ships operating in polar waters. 
 
 Provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly 
trained to cope with a situation where their ship 
comes under attack by pirates 
  
 Master and deck department; engine department; 
radio communication and radio operators; special 
training requirements for personnel on certain types 
of ships; Emergency, occupational safety, medical 
care, and survival functions; alternative certification; 
and Watchkeeping. 
Research Methodology 
• Semi-structured interviews made to the Master of Harbours, directors of Customs Maritime Units, directors of 
ports, PFSOs from ports and some terminals of hydrocarbons, presidents of UCMAR (1st Commander of the 
Navy Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station) and commandants of the port and maritime police (Naval Unit for 
Port Security, also called NAUPS) and the Gulf’s Navy Force; 
 
• Participant observation at the terminals and Master of Harbours installations and ports, including not only the 
land areas but also the maritime passages; which were visited on board oceanic patrols from the Mexican 
Navy ( A visit of three months to maritime ports in Mexico); 
 
• The pool of data is deemed sufficient, based on the fact that it includes eight out of sixteen Federal Integrated 
Ports Administrations (FIPA) in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, representing a coverture of 50% of 
them and seven out of seven FIPAs situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and production 
activities take place, achieving a 100% coverture of them. 
 
• Plus one State-Owned Integrated Port Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil 
activity is concentrated was also included in the study. 
 
• The total of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all of them practicing in areas of maritime safety and 
security.  
 
• The data was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and themes were identified and coded using 
thematic analysis and constant comparison of the data. 
 
 
 
 
Ports & Terminals Included in the Study 
All ports located in the 
Gulf of Mexico, plus one 
of the hub ports located 
in the Pacific were 
included in the study. 
Results 
 From the interviewed subjects with functions of Master of Harbour 75% expressed their approval to be 
transferred to the MMAR and supported the law decree, while 25% strongly disapproved the 
transferral between the institutions. 
 
 From the interviewed directors of maritime customs units 87.5% supported the law decree. 
 
 From the interviewed directors of Federal Integrated Port Administrations 75% supported the law 
decree.  
 
 From the interviewed subjects with functions of presidents of UCMAR 100% supported the law decree. 
 
 100%  of subjects with functions of commandants from the NAUPPRO (port police) supported the law 
decree. 
 
 87.5% from interviewed Port Security Officers (PSO) supported the transferral. 
 
 80% from interviewed subjects functioning as Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) from hydrocarbon 
terminals supported the transferral.  
Results 
 
 (I) poor performance of Masters of Harbours from 
the MCT;  
 
 (II) acute lack of human and material resources 
available for masters of harbours to comply with 
their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory 
manner;  
 
 (III) high exposure to corruption on the part of 
Masters of Harbours related to Mexican crime ring 
organizations due to death threats against them or 
their families;  
 
 (IV) fair on the part of Master of Harbours for 
loosing their jobs in a late stage of their productive 
life;  
 
 (V) uncertainty on the part of Master of Harbours 
with respect to their salary’s level, working rights 
and pension schemes;  
 
 (VI) improvement of salary and working rights for 
Master of Harbours and their personnel with the 
transferral to MMAR;  
 
 
 (VII) already high participation of the Mexican Navy 
performing duties that correspond to Master of Harbours;  
 
 (VIII) fair on the part of directors of port administrations for 
lack of knowledge, stubbornness and 
unwillingness/inflexibility to negotiate on factors related to 
business issues with respect to authorities from the 
Mexican Navy;  
 
 (IX) security improvement for offshore installations and 
vessels serving the oil market; 
 
  (X) trust in a significant improvement of maritime safety 
and security on the part of directors of maritime customs 
units with the transferral of Master of Harbour offices to the 
Ministry of Marine;  
 
 (XI) bigger and better capabilities to combat crime ring 
organizations that are using port installations for transport 
of drugs, weapons, money laundry and transport of stolen 
hydrocarbons, and finally;  
 
 (XII) need of providing juridical support and attributions to 
the MMAR to activities already performed by the Navy and 
which currently are outside their attributions juridically. 
Twelve categories were identified that either prevent or promote the transferral of Master of Harbours from MCT to MMAR: 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
 The authors concluded that the decree approved by the National Congress of Mexico to reform the 
country’s legal framework and allow the shift of maritime safety and security responsibility, as well as port 
state control from a civil authority (Ministry of Communications and Transport, MCT) towards a military 
one (Ministry of Marine, MMAR) has a high level of acceptance between the four pillar institutions 
involved in port and maritime safety and security. 
 
 MMAR must ensure the application of integrity and anti-corruption programs during the transferral 
process, to avoid the transference of old corruption practices too, with respect to ship’s inspections, 
including revision of and issuance of crew certificates and to ensure an efficient and effective 
performance of its new role.  
 
 MMAR must recover the control of all control centres for maritime traffic that currently are operated and 
administrated by Pemex, including the centre for control of maritime traffic at the offshore and oil 
production area of Campeche.  
 
 MMAR must update the guidelines for the Navy Unit of  Port Protection (NAUPPRO) concerning its 
duties and responsibilities with clear, concrete and specific duties to ensure the compliance of  ISPS 
Code requirements at ports and port terminals. Due to the military discipline they do not follow their 
obligations established in the Law of Ports if they have not receive the order  from their superiors. 
 
 MMAR must also avoid misuse of high security trained resources in duties that are outside their 
competence and specially avoid allocating to the maritime police (NAUPPRO), duties and responsibilities 
that actually are performed by the staff belonging to masters of harbours. 
 
 it is recommended to develop a study concerning the reduction of master of harbour Offices located 
around the country from 117 to 30 to ensure an efficient and effective management of these where they 
are really needed, especially at the Federal Integrated Port Administrations. 
 

